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## 1. Principal and Ancillary Objectives:

## A. Principal Objectives:

- 1. By exploitation of the theme of Stalin's death, to cause maximum disruption to the Soviet and Soviet-controlled machinery, within and without the Orbit, both prior to, and after the event.
- 2. To ensourage defections and/or registance within the armed forces and at other levels of the Soviet machine, world-wide, through exploitation of this theme.
- 3. To stiffen disaffection end encourage effective resistance at all levels of the Soviet, Soviet-dominated and Soviet-inclined peoples and groups throughout the world, by the use of this theme.

### B. Ancillary Objectives:

- 1. Pending Stalin's death, to sow insecurity at all levels of the Soviet hierarchy through accounts of past purges and predictions of future adverse developments.
- 2. To instill within the military the desire to seize the opportunity to liberate the people of the USSR and to encourage the people to incite and support the armed forces to struggle for liberation.
- 3. To weaken the effectiveness of the State Security personnel by bringing to their attention that the day of reckoning is approach-

ing and anything they of against the people will be held against Approved For Release 2001/07/27: CIA-RDP80-01065A000500020014-6 GUFY 7 UF

#### them in the event of:

- (a) upheaval on the part of the people.
- (b) the possibility of military distatorship.
- is. To suggest to the people the opportunity, presented by the change in the regime and consequent dissension at the top levels, of negating the efficiency of the Police State oppression, through
  - (a) passive resistance;
  - (b) slow-downs in production;
  - (c) collective efforts at neutralising the informant net system.
- 5. To suggest to non-Orbit Communist parties and leaders that subservience to Moscow can no longer be construed as ideological ellegience to the Prophet of Marxism-Leminism nor to the prophecy of better times shead, but as simple anti-national fifth column setivity for an aggressive foreign power. The intent will be to diminish local influence of the party while advancing the concept of National Communism and causing attrition of Eremlin capabilities world-wide.
  - 6. To intensify feelings of insecurity among Satellite leaders.
- 7. To elicit spontaneous statements of concern and support for the oppressed peoples of the Orbit at a time when the upbesvals of the Police State machine give them their first opportunity of self-liberation.

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- (1) That our only current means of directly affecting elements within the Soviet Union is through radio broadcasting facilities.
- (2) That our best capabilities of spreading rumor and/or fact within the Seviet Union lie in the exploitation of our facilities for being heard by Seviet ecoupation forces in Germany, Austria and the Satellites, to which should be added the Seviet technical troops in Korea through indigenous and emigra elements.
- (3) That our present capabilities in the Far East should be utilized and intensified in support of the attainment of the objectives outlined in this paper.
- b. An evaluation of our capabilities shows that:
  - (1) Our coverage of the European Satellites and the Far
    East for the purposes of the European Satellites and the Far
    tions is our most developed present capability.

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- (2) Our considerable capabilities in the free world are convertible to targets but are not currently geared to such coordinated effort.
- (3) No effort to coordinate policy or action with foreign governments and controlled media has been initiated, posing an emergency problem that demands prompt and vigorous action.
- (b) Expanded capabilities will be needed to meet effectively the opportunity presented by Stalin's death and these capabilities must be developed without further loss of time.

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c. The media and techniques to be brought to include include the following, which must be divided into overt and covert courses of action:

#### (1) Overt means.

- (a) State Department action: Controlled diplomatic action IIA
- (b) U.S. government inspired press: Domestic and Poreign
- (e) U.S. controlled media: RIAS Berlin BOT-WEIS-ROT IIA Film program
- (d) Military attache system
- (a) MSA representation
- (f) TCA representation (Point Four)
- (g) Fereign controlled media (BBC, RADIO MADRID, RADIO ISTANBUL, etc.)

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- d. Overt and covert exploitation of the theme of Stalin's death falls into two time phases:
  - (1) From the present to death;
  - (2) Subsequent to death.

Both phases demand carefully synchronised overt and covert action. Moreover, the first or interim phase must be used for the development of the expanded capabilities needed for the second phase.

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